Why has India opened a backchannel to the Taliban? | Asia

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In a crucial policy shift, India recently admitted that it had entered back door communications with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

In early June, Indian media reported that New Delhi had entered into talks with some factions and leaders of the armed group amid the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan. A few days later, the Indian Foreign Ministry virtually confirmed this information, stating that “we are in contact with various stakeholders … in accordance with our long-term commitment to the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan”.

Quetta-based Taliban leaders and Qatari officials have also confirmed these behind-the-scenes meetings.

Until recently, India was reluctant to openly communicate with the Taliban because it feared that such a move could damage its relationship with the Afghan government and its powerful regional and global backers. While Indian intelligence officials have on occasion approached Taliban fighters to protect India’s interests over the years, most notably in 2011 to secure the release of kidnapped Indian engineers and personnel working in Afghanistan, New Delhi has moved forward. always refrained from establishing a permanent channel of communication with the group.

He saw the Taliban as nothing more than a proxy for its main regional rival, Pakistan, and believed he had little to gain from engaging directly with the group. Further, New Delhi was unwilling to compromise its official policy of not speaking to any “militant groups” when engaging in dialogue with the Taliban, as it believed this would put it under increased pressure to start speaking to rebel groups. of Kashmir as well.

But a lot has changed in recent years.

In 2015, Iran and Russia began supporting the Taliban to prevent another armed group, the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), from expanding its influence in Afghanistan. Knowing the limitations of the Afghan security forces and the Taliban task force, they chose to forge a working relationship with the Taliban to contain the ISK.

Since then, the Taliban have established themselves more as a legitimate actor in Afghanistan by gradually strengthening their diplomatic relations with the international community, securing significant territorial gains against the Afghan government and concluding a historic peace agreement with the states. United in February 2020. It is widely accepted that the Taliban will continue to have significant influence over Afghanistan after the United States completes its withdrawal from the country in September 2021.

All of this put India in a difficult position and forced it to rethink its approach to the armed group. Ultimately, he decided to form channels of communication with relatively Taliban-friendly factions to avoid losing strategic space to regional rivals, especially Pakistan, after the United States withdrew from it. ‘Afghanistan.

In September 2020, Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar expressed his country’s interest in initiating a dialogue with the Taliban for the first time by participating in the intra-Afghan peace talks taking place in Doha by video link. A high-ranking Indian delegation also attended the talks. It was the first time that senior Indian officials attended an event in an official capacity alongside representatives of the Taliban. Since then, Indian security officials have started to open channels of communication with several Taliban factions perceived to be “nationalist” or outside the sphere of influence of Pakistan and Iran.

India has a lot to gain from these backchannel communications. New Delhi wants to protect its security interests and investments in Afghanistan after the United States leaves the country. In particular, he wants to ensure that Kashmir-focused armed groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) do not use Afghanistan as a staging ground to launch attacks in Kashmir. under Indian administration. Having a backchannel with the Taliban can help Indian authorities ensure that Afghanistan does not turn into a great security threat to New Delhi in the years to come.

The Taliban can also gain a lot from a backchannel with India. The group will need significant external assistance after the United States leaves Afghanistan to achieve its development and reconstruction goals. India can provide this aid in exchange for security guarantees.

India’s awareness of the Taliban may also positively affect the ongoing Afghan peace process by downplaying the possibility of an Indo-Pakistani proxy war in post-American Afghanistan. If India succeeds in establishing an informal bilateral relationship with the Taliban, Afghanistan can stay away from any skirmishes between India and Pakistan in the future and instead focus on its own internal issues and struggles.

But the success of India’s indirect communications with the Taliban will depend, at least in part, on Pakistan’s response. At best, Islamabad will choose to remain neutral, neither encouraging nor discouraging such contacts. At worst, he will put aside elements within the Taliban known to be talking to India and discourage the armed group from communicating with New Delhi.

While Pakistan’s opposition will undoubtedly hamper dialogue between the Taliban and India, it will not necessarily end it.

The Taliban have remained neutral in the face of Indo-Pakistani tensions over the revocation of Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status in August 2019, demonstrating that they want to forge a foreign policy independent of Pakistan.

While it is undoubtedly still heavily dependent on Pakistan, its recent territorial gains against the Afghan government, its growing financial independence, and its newly formed diplomatic relations with other influential members of the international community, have given the Taliban a certain level of independence. It is now positioned to become a political power accepted by the international community and it is slowly escaping Pakistan’s grip.

All of this indicates that the Taliban will continue to speak to India despite Pakistan’s protests. But only time will tell whether this dialogue will succeed in providing the security and stability that the region so badly needs.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera.



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